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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
HAROLD A. ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge: 
 
This appeal arises out the employment termination of 
appellant Patrick J. Boyle ("Boyle") by the County of 
Allegheny, Pennsylvania from his position as Deputy 
Director of Marketing and Communications in the county's 
Department of Aviation. Boyle, a Democrat, alleged in his 
complaint that he was terminated based on his political 
affiliation in violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 
U.S.C. S 1983. Boyle sought reinstatement to the position of 
Deputy Director, various other equitable relief and 
compensatory and punitive damages for pain, suffering, 
emotional distress and humiliation resulting from his 
allegedly unlawful termination. 
 
While denying that he was terminated for his political 
affiliation, defendants/appellees moved for summary 
judgment in the district court contending that even if he 
were, such a termination was proper under Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347 (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1979), 
and their progeny. Boyle opposed the motion, relying in 
large measure on the deposition testimonies of two of the 
three members of the Board of Commissioners of Allegheny 
County. These Commissioners testified that political 
affiliation was not an appropriate requirement for the 
position of Deputy Director of Marketing and 
Communications. 
 
The district court granted defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that the deposition 
testimonies of the two Commissioners were not significantly 
probative on the question of whether political affiliation was 
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an appropriate requirement for the position held by Boyle 
under Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We reverse. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
The Board of Commissioners of Allegheny County has 
traditionally been a stronghold for the Democratic Party. 
For nearly fifty years, until 1995, the three-member Board 
was comprised of a Democratic majority. In 1995, however, 
two Republican Commissioners, Larry Dunn and Bob 
Cranmer,1 were elected, and the Board became a 
Republican majority. 
 
Boyle was hired by Allegheny County as Deputy Director 
in its Department of Aviation on January 21, 1986. By 
letter, dated December 21, 1995, Dunn and Cranmer, as 
Commissioners-elect, demanded plaintiff 's resignation 
based upon their belief that "those in management and 
leadership positions, appointed to our new administration, 
share our priorities of government." When the new 
Republican-dominated Board took office in January, 1996, 
the county terminated the employment of a number of 
directors and deputy directors, including Boyle. Boyle 
contends in his suit that he was terminated because he 
was a registered Democrat and he supported the election 
campaigns of Democratic candidates for county 
Commissioner. 
 
A. Job Duties and Responsibilities 
 
The Deputy Director position was a third level 
management position in the governmental hierarchy in 
Allegheny County with respect to the Department of 
Aviation. Boyle reported directly to the Director, who in 
turn, reported to the Board of Commissioners. The 
positions reporting directly to the Deputy Director included 
the manager of public relations, senior administrative 
officer/capital projects, marketing analyst, information 
clerk supervisor and senior secretary. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The lone Democrat remaining on the Board was Michael Dawida. 
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At some time during his employment, Boyle drafted a job 
description for the position of Deputy Director of Marketing 
and Communications.2 Boyle characterized his position as 
a management level staff position "designed to carry out 
policy decisions by the Director of Aviation and the County 
Commissioners . . . [and to] interpret policy requirements, 
act and sign documents on behalf of the director, speak to 
news media on the record, and initiate or respond to public 
affairs activities as required." He was "responsible for 
planning, preparing, and executing all communications, 
marketing and development programs for the aviation 
system, as well as coordinating public affairs and 
community relations activities, and the airport public 
information program." 
 
The job description listed the Deputy Director's "Major 
Duties" as follows: 
        (1) Supervise and manage all activities of the 
       marketing, community relations, and public 
       information functions of the aviation system. 
 
       (2) Develop and prepare written material for public 
       dissemination, including news releases, marketing 
       reports, newsletters and correspondence. 
 
       (3) Maintain contact with prospective and present 
       clients and tenants. 
 
       (4) Develop and coordinate program to deal with 
       complaints, passenger relations with airport tenants, 
       and other travelers' concerns, especially insofar as 
       these activities affect airport operations and 
       maintenance. 
 
       (5) Monitor and review any airport problem that may 
       be apparent to the public, and advise the appropriate 
       section of such problems and any public relations 
       ramifications. 
 
       (6) Observe and interpret accidents, emergencies, and 
       disaster scenes to determine how best to handle the 
       response by news media. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Boyle testified in his deposition that the job description, in general, 
accurately described the duties he had as Deputy Director. 
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       (7) Coordinate and authorize news coverage of any 
       activity in the airport, assist the news media in 
       covering events and staff the emergency 
       communications center when necessary and provide 
       needed logistical support to media. 
 
       (8) Serve as authorized airport spokesman. 
 
       (9) Manage or assist special projects required to 
       support airport mission, for instance, dedicating new 
       buildings, hosting VIP tours, sponsoring seminars, etc. 
 
       (10) Coordinate airport initiatives and responses in 
       rate cases, new service opportunities, development 
       projects, etc. 
 
       (11) Oversee information clerks and disbursal of 
       information from airport information desks. Regulate 
       material given out at information desks. 
        (12) Prepare correspondence for director and 
       commissioners. 
 
       (13) Advise Director and Commissioners about 
       protocol, background and ramifications of events, 
       opportunities, proposals, etc. 
 
       (14) Develop and manage programs for airport tours 
       and speakers' bureau. Liaison with tenants to include 
       wide array of resources for public information. 
 
       (15) Stand in for the Director at Commissioners' 
       meetings in his absence. 
 
       (16) Develop in-service training programs and other 
       educational programs to educate staff and maintain 
       current awareness of significant issues. 
 
       (17) Approve all information from the Department that 
       will be disseminated to the public. 
 
       (18) Maintain logs of tours, visitors, speakers, 
       meetings, events and airport business, and prepare 
       reports reflecting all airport activities on a regular basis 
       for Director and Commissioners. 
 
       (19) Liaison with regional groups such as Penns 
       Southwest, Chamber of Commerce, R.I.D.C., 
       Convention & Visitors Bureau, and business groups. 
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       (20) Manage contracts and programs to market and 
       promote the airports, the County or the region, 
       including supervision of consultants for advertising, 
       marketing, promotion, etc. 
  
In addition, Boyle completed a "Job Evaluation 
Questionnaire" in May, 1994 which, among other things, 
asked him to describe "the specific duties and 
responsibilities involved in doing your job." The top five 
duties and responsibilities were as follows: (1) Crisis 
Management/Problem Solving; (2) Media Relations; 
(3) Internal Communications/Information Services; 
(4) Policy Implementation/Advice; and (5) Community 
Relations/Public Affairs. Boyle also acknowledged that a 
crucial part of his job was to "influence, promote and sell" 
to community and professional contacts. With regard to the 
level of guidance necessary to perform his job, Boyle 
checked the category "Broad," which was defined as: 
 
       With managerial responsibility, there is latitude for 
       decision making and setting of priorities. Long range 
       projects (over one year) are assigned which are 
       reviewed through achievement of objectives, according 
       to predefined goals. 
 
Boyle also acknowledged that "the effect of typical errors 
made in the course of performing the duties of this job" 
would have a "[s]ignificant impact affecting major programs, 
or corporate objectives, impairing the performance of the 
Department of Aviation," and that he had "[c]omplete 
freedom for independent judgment and discretion." 
 
A further glimpse into Boyle's duties and responsibilities 
is provided by letters sent by him to prospective employers. 
For instance, in a letter, dated November 24, 1995, to a 
general manager at the Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority, Boyle stated that he was hired by Allegheny 
County to "assist in lobbying, planning, building and 
dedicating a new billion dollar airport." This project, 
according to Boyle, involved "extensive negotiations with 
Federal and State officials, airlines, and the construction 
industry, and included considerable interaction with 
community groups." In another letter seeking a position at 
the Pittsburgh Foundation, dated May 23, 1996, Boyle 
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stated that as Deputy Director, he "served as airport 
spokesman and managed all public affairs, marketing and 
communications." 
 
A letter of recommendation from the chairman of the 
county Commission, Tom Foerster, which was drafted by 
Boyle himself, stated that Boyle joined the chairman's staff 
in 1986 "to line up state funding for Strategy 21 and 
persuade USAir to build the Midfield Terminal." He further 
stated that Boyle "has been of great value . . . for many 
years as a speech writer, corresponding secretary, and 
trouble-shooter at the airport." 
 
After his termination, Boyle applied for unemployment 
benefits. In a questionnaire completed by Boyle, he stated 
that his duties as Deputy Director were to "manage 
communications and public relations for [the] airport," that 
he had "full discretion and responsibility," and that he "had 
full authority to make and implement decisions." 
 
In deposition testimony, Boyle acknowledged that as 
Deputy Director, he would report to the Commissioners on 
various matters, including the ramifications of various 
policies and proposed policies of the Commissioners. Boyle 
would also occasionally sit in on county Board meetings on 
behalf of the Director. The Board's minutes reveal that 
Boyle engaged in discussions with the Commissioners on 
various issues affecting the Department of Aviation. The 
minutes further reflect that Boyle at times made formal 
Requests for Board Action on behalf of the Director. 
 
Significantly, in a letter, dated October 31, 1995, Boyle 
stated that "[f]or the past 10 years, I have been deputy 
director of Pittsburgh International Airport, and have served 
informally as Commissioner Tom Foerster's director of 
correspondence." 
 
At the time of his termination, Boyle's annual salary was 
$57,035.52. 
 
B. Deposition Testimonies of Commissioners 
 
In his deposition, Cranmer, one of the new Republican 
Commissioners on the Board, testified that the position of 
Deputy Director did not require a certain political 
affiliation: 
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       Q. If you were listing requirements for the deputy 
       director of marketing and communications at the 
       aviation department, would affiliation with one 
       political party or another be a requirement for 
       that? 
 
       A. No. 
 
       Q. Would support of one candidate in the last election 
       or not -- 
 
       A. No. 
 
       Q. You've got to let me finish. Would support of one 
       candidate in the last election be an appropriate 
       requirement for the position of deputy director of 
       marketing and communications? 
 
       A. No. 
 
Mr. Cranmer further testified that there was no "rational 
connection between political affiliation" and the position of 
Deputy Director, contradicting the defendants' answers to 
interrogatories on this issue. Mr. Cranmer stated in no 
uncertain terms that he did not "agree with the fact that a 
political affiliation has anything to do with this job, has 
nothing to do with it." 
 Michael Dawida, the lone Democratic Commissioner on 
the Board, provided similar testimony: 
 
       Q. Commissioner, does the position of deputy director 
       of marketing and communications for the 
       Department of Aviation require that a person have 
       a certain political affiliation? 
 
       A. No. Absolutely not. 
 
       Q. Does the fact that one is either a Democrat or 
       Republican affect that person's ability to do the 
       job? 
 
       A. Absolutely not. 
 
       Q. Does the fact that the person in that position 
       supported one political party of the other political 
       party affect his or her ability to do the job? 
 
       A. No. 
 
                                8 
 
 
 
       Q. Does the fact that the person in that position 
       supported one candidate over another in a prior 
       election affect his or her ability to do that job? 
 
       A. No. 
 
Confronted with seemingly strong evidence that Boyle's 
position allowed him to have meaningful input into 
significant issues affecting the county, on the one hand, 
and the deposition testimonies, on the other, the district 
court chose the former, and granted the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment: 
 
       [T]he undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff 's 
       duties as Deputy Director were of broad scope, that 
       plaintiff acted as an advisor to policymakers and that 
       plaintiff participated in discussions and other meetings 
       with policymakers and had the authority in some 
       instances to act and speak on behalf of policymakers. 
       The Court, therefore, finds as a matter of law that the 
       duties inherent in the position of Deputy Director are 
       such that political ideology is an appropriate 
       requirement for the effective performance of that 
       position. Accordingly, terminating plaintiff from the 
       Deputy Director position because of plaintiff 's political 
       affiliation would not offend the First Amendment. 
 
Memorandum Op. at 19. 
 
The significance of the deposition testimonies of Cranmer 
and Dawida was disposed of in a footnote as follows, in its 
entirety: 
 
       Plaintiff's reliance on the deposition testimony of two 
       County Commissioners, that is, Cranmer and Dawida, 
       in that those individuals testified that party affiliation 
       is not an appropriate requirement for the Deputy 
       Director position does not affect the Court's conclusion. 
       In light of the undisputed evidence regarding plaintiff's 
       authorized and actual duties as Deputy Director, the 
       Court finds that the cited deposition testimony does 
       not create a genuine issue of material fact. See 
       Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 
       1994) ("There must be sufficient evidence for a jury to 
       return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party; if the 
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       evidence is merely colorable or not significantly 
       probative, summary judgment should be granted."). 
 
Id. at 20 n.7. 
 
Had the district court been sitting as the finder of fact, 
we would have little trouble in affirming its decision. 
However, at the summary judgment stage, the district court 
improperly weighed conflicting evidence in granting the 
defendants' motion. The deposition testimonies of two of the 
three members of the Board of Commissioners, which 
constituted the relevant hiring authority in this case, 
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
position of Deputy Director of the Department of Aviation 
was subject to the Elrod/Branti exception. Accordingly, this 
court is constrained to reverse the district court's decision 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
This Court exercises plenary review of the district court's 
granting of summary judgment. See Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 
F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, "the appellate 
court is required to apply the same test the district court 
should have utilized." Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 
F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 
1052 (1987); see also Sempier v. John & Higgins, 45 F.3d 
724, 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995). 
 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a 
motion for summary judgment will be granted 
        if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
       interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
       the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
       issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
       entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
 
See also Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 896. In other words, "summary 
judgment may be granted if the movant shows that there 
exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit 
a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party." Miller v. 
Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 870 (1988). All facts and inferences are construed 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Peters 
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v. Delaware River Port Auth. of Pa. and N.J., 16 F.3d 1346, 
1349 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 811 (1994). 
 
The substantive law will identify which facts are 
"material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
247-48 (1986). Therefore, "[o]nly disputes over facts that 
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." 
Id. An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could possibly 
hold in the nonmovant's favor with regard to that issue. Id. 
 
However, at the summary judgment stage, a court may 
not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations; 
these tasks are left to the fact-finder. Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 
1224, 1330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 994 (1993). 
Therefore, to raise a genuine issue of material fact, " `the 
[summary judgment] opponent need not match, item for 
item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant,' but 
simply must exceed the `mere scintilla' standard." Id.; see 
also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 ("The mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] 
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on 
which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]."). 
 
It is clear, however, that if a moving party satisfies its 
initial burden of proving a prima facie case for summary 
judgment, the opposing party "must do more than simply 
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material 
facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, "[t]here must be 
sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in favor of 
the non-moving party; if the evidence is merely colorable or 
not significantly probative, summary judgment should be 
granted." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
The primary issue raised on appeal is fairly 
straightforward: whether the district court erred in 
discounting the statements made by two of the three 
Allegheny County Commissioners--to the effect that 
political affiliation was not an important factor for the job 
of Deputy Director of Marketing and Communications in 
the county's Department of Aviation--in granting the 
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defendants' motion for summary judgment. Boyle argues in 
his appeal that the district court engaged in an improper 
weighing of the evidence. The statements made by the two 
Commissioners, Boyle contends, constitute admissions, and 
thus, the district court erred in finding that they lacked any 
probative significance. We agree. 
 
In arguing for affirmance of the district court's decision, 
appellees characterize the deposition testimonies as 
"probative of nothing." Appellee's Brf. at 38. Appellees argue 
that whatever statements may have been made by the two 
Commissioners, the legal test remains whether the 
authorized duties and functions of the employee's position 
is confidential or policymaking. The statements by the 
Commissioners, according to the appellees, shed no light on 
the factors which both the Supreme Court and this court 
have held to be relevant. 
 
While it is true that both the Supreme Court and this 
court have developed various formulations to be applied in 
political patronage cases in general, those cases did not 
involve statements made by the relevant hiring authority to 
the effect that a particular political affiliation was not an 
appropriate requirement for the particular position. Indeed, 
the precise issue raised in this appeal is one of first 
impression in this circuit. While the ever evolving 
formulations developed by the Supreme Court and this 
court are to be applied in cases which present no 
conflicting testimony from members of the hiring authority, 
we believe that a rigid application of such tests under the 
circumstances of this case would render the relevant 
analysis overly formalistic and not consonant with the 
principles and rationales underlying the development of the 
law in the area of political patronage. 
 
Political patronage is a practice as old as the American 
Republic. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that political 
patronage "bears the endorsement of a long tradition of 
open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to 
the beginning of the Republic"). It has been argued by 
commentators that political patronage, while at times 
possessing a pejorative connotation, has been a basic and 
accepted element in the development of the American form 
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of democratic government, essential to maintain loyalty and 
strength in the political party system. See R. Hofstadter, 
The Idea of a Party System, 225-26 (1969). While political 
patronage has certainly been embedded in the fabric of the 
American political process, the case law concerning its 
limitations in the face of countervailing First Amendment 
rights is of more recent vintage. 
 
In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), the Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the discharge of a 
government employee because of his political affiliation 
violates the freedom of association clause of the First 
Amendment. Id. at 373. The case arose from the election of 
a Democratic Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois who, upon 
taking office, terminated the employment of deputy sheriffs 
who were not members or who did not otherwise support 
the Democratic party. In finding that such a practice 
violated the First Amendment, the Supreme Court generally 
ended the practice of "cleaning house," whereby the 
prevailing political party would fire many employees who 
were members of the losing party, and give the vacant 
positions to loyal supporters as the spoils of victory. 
 
The Elrod Court recognized that termination based solely 
on political affiliation, on its face, was at war with First 
Amendment principles. 427 U.S. at 359. The Court, 
however, did not completely do away with the practice, but 
recognized that political affiliation was relevant to the 
performance of the duties of certain positions. Id. at 367. 
The Court justified this exception by weighing the 
governmental benefit of considering political affiliation 
as a criterion in employment decisions against the 
encroachment on an employee's First Amendment 
right to political association. Id. A plurality of 
the Court distinguished between "policymaking" and 
"nonpolicymaking" positions in determining when political 
affiliation was relevant for employment decisions. Id. at 
367-68. Those positions falling into the former category 
were held to be exempt from the general prohibition against 
terminating employees based on political affiliation. Id. at 
372. Accordingly, a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential 
government employee" could not be discharged on the sole 
ground of his political beliefs. Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). The plurality acknowledged that 
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       [n]o clear line can be drawn between policymaking and 
       nonpolicymaking positions. While nonpolicymaking 
       individuals usually have limited responsibility, that is 
       not to say that one with a number of responsibilities is 
       necessarily in a policymaking position. The nature of 
       the responsibilities is critical . . . . An employee with 
       responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad 
       scope more likely functions in a policymaking position. 
       In determining whether an employee occupies a 
       policymaking position, consideration should also be 
       given to whether the employee acts as an adviser or 
       formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals. 
 
Id. at 367-68. 
 
The Court also made clear that the intermediate 
"exacting" level of scrutiny must be applied. Id. at 362. 
Thus, the "interest advanced must be paramount, one of 
vital importance, and the burden is on the government to 
show the existence of such an interest." Id. 
 
Three years later, the Supreme Court reformulated the 
Elrod test. In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1979), two 
county assistant public defenders brought a civil rights 
action alleging that their imminent termination by the 
newly appointed Democratic public defender was based 
solely on the fact that they were Republicans. The Court 
reiterated the general principle that if an employee's 
"private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge 
of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be 
required to yield to the State's vital interest in maintaining 
governmental effectiveness and efficiency." Id. at 517. 
 
The Branti Court was clearly dissatisfied with the 
categorical approach enunciated in Elrod, which 
distinguished between "policymaking" and 
"nonpolicymaking" positions, and sought to clarify that test. 
445 U.S. at 518. Accordingly, the Branti Court held that 
"the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label `policymaker' 
or `confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the 
question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate 
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the public office involved." 445 U.S. 
at 518. 
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In Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1981), Judge 
Gibbons, writing for this court in its first foray into the 
political patronage issue, proceeded to adopt a standard 
which further refined the Elrod/Branti test by using what 
the court termed a "functional analysis" approach. Under 
this test, should a difference in party affiliation be "highly 
likely to cause an official to be ineffective in carrying out" 
the duties of the position, then dismissal for that reason 
would not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 521. Applying 
that test to the city solicitors in the case, the court found 
that a lawyer's duties--e.g., rendering legal opinions, 
drafting ordinances, negotiating contracts--defined a 
position for which party affiliation was an appropriate 
requirement. 
 
In Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1986), 
this court sought to further refine and clarify the 
Elrod/Branti test in this circuit by making clear that the 
"relevant inquiry is to the function of the public office in 
question and not the actual past duties of the particular 
employee involved." This court also noted that the 
 
       fact that an employee is in a policymaking or 
       confidential position is relevant to the question of 
       whether political affiliation is a necessary job 
       requirement but this fact is no longer dispositive after 
       Branti. 
 
Id. at 168-69. After reviewing a number of cases arising 
under Elrod and Branti in other jurisdictions, the Brown 
court concluded that the "key factor" seemed to be "not 
whether the employee was a supervisor or had a great deal 
of responsibility but whether the employee has `meaningful 
input into decisionmaking concerning the nature and scope 
of a major township program.' " 787 F.2d at 169-70 
(quoting Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982)). Factors relevant 
in this inquiry include 
 
       whether the employee's duties are simply . . . 
       nondiscretionary or technical, . . . whether the 
       employee participates in . . . discussions or other 
       meetings, whether the employee prepares budgets or 
       has authority to hire or fire employees, the salary of 
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       the employee, and the employee's power to control 
       others and to speak in the name of policymakers. 
 
Id. at 169 (citations omitted). 
 
To a great degree, the evolution of political patronage law 
in the Third Circuit as embodied in the case law discussed 
above, set the stage for this court's watershed opinion in 
Zold v. Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Zold's significance lies in its synthesis of prior decisions up 
to that point and articulation of the intermediate level of 
scrutiny in political patronage cases, consistent with the 
principle first enunciated in Elrod by Justice Brennan. See 
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362. In Zold, this court acknowledged 
that "[i]t is not always easy to determine whether affiliation 
is a legitimate factor to be considered for a particular job," 
and that each decision is "fact specific for that case." 935 
F.2d at 635. The court found, however, that although a 
"nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee 
cannot be discharged on the sole ground of his or her 
political beliefs," he or she can be dismissed on that ground 
if he or she "acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the 
implementation of broad goals." Id. at 635. Of course, as 
stated in Branti, the ultimate inquiry is not whether a 
position can be termed policymaking or confidential, but 
whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective 
performance of the public office involved.3 Id. 
 
The Zold decision is significant for its explicit adoption of 
the special scrutiny standard. But as with Elrod and Branti, 
and their progeny, the adoption of the special scrutiny 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Significantly, this court held that because the case implicated the 
First 
Amendment, it would "make an independent examination of the whole 
record." Zold, 935 F.2d at 636. Relying on New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), the court concluded that when an issue on appeal 
turns on a "constitutional fact"--those whose determination is decisive of 
a constitutional issue--appellate courts are obligated to review such 
facts with "special scrutiny." Zold, 935 F.2d at 636. Moreover, an 
appellate court "may draw its own inference from facts in the record." Id. 
 
We have accordingly undertaken an independent examination of the 
record developed in the district court and have drawn our own 
inferences from those facts. 
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standard does not in and of itself provide a great deal of 
guidance in the practical application of that test, and thus, 
Zold reaffirms the limitations inherent in attempting to 
establish factors to be used by courts in analyzing political 
patronage claims. 
 
The lack of explicit guidance from the Supreme Court 
and this court thus far, however, results in a greater 
flexibility on the part of lower courts to determine each case 
under its own facts and in its own context. Thisflexibility 
may serve the dual goals of the Elrod/Branti exception: to 
permit governmental entities to use political affiliation 
where the governmental interest is "overriding" and of "vital 
importance," while concomitantly protecting the individual's 
right to freedom of association guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362, 368; Branti, 445 U.S. 
at 515-16. 
 
To this end, Elrod, Branti and their progeny have 
established certain principles of law which constitute the 
general parameters by which the analysis must be guided. 
These cases require courts to focus on various factors, 
including whether an employee is a "nonpolicymaking, 
nonconfidential government employee," Elrod, 427 U.S. at 
375 (Stewart, J., concurring), whether a difference in party 
affiliation would be "highly likely to cause an official to be 
ineffective in carrying out" the duties of the position, Ness, 
660 F.2d at 521, whether "the employee has meaningful 
input into decision making concerning the nature and 
scope of a major . . . program," Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70, 
or whether the employee "acts as an advisor or formulates 
plans for the implementation of broad goals," Zold, 935 
F.2d at 635; Peters, 16 F.3d at 1354. 
 
The "burden of proof is on the defendant to demonstrate 
`an overriding interest' in order to validate an encroachment 
on an employee's First Amendment rights." Zold, 935 F.2d 
at 635 (quoting Elrod, 426 U.S. at 368); see also Rosenthal 
v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390, 394 n.5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 894 (1977). This burden is "substantial." Burns v. 
County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993). Moreover, the court 
must apply the intermediate "exacting" level of scrutiny. 
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362; Zold, 935 F.2d at 636. 
 
                                17 
 
 
 
In general, courts are also advised to look to the 
"function[s] of the office in question and not the actual past 
duties of the particular employee involved." Peters, 16 F.3d 
at 1353; Brown, 787 F.2d at 168; O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 
F.2d 905, 911 (1st Cir.) ("[T]he actual past duties of the 
discharged employee are irrelevant if the position inherently 
encompasses more expansive powers and more important 
functions that would tend to make political affiliation an 
appropriate requirement for effective performance."), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1024 (1993). Although actual past duties 
are not determinative, they may be informative. Waskovich 
v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The question of whether an employee falls within the 
Elrod/Branti exception is generally one of fact. Furlong v. 
Gudknecht, 808 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1986); Rosenthal, 
555 F.2d at 393 n.5. However, summary judgment may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances. Ness, 660 F.2d at 
521. 
 
The above described principles are certainly applicable to 
ordinary political patronage cases. However, the existence 
of the deposition testimonies in this case takes this case, 
we believe, out of the ordinary realm. The case law 
developed in this area has generally not involved a similar 
situation where a hiring authority specifically testifies that 
political affiliation is not an appropriate requirement for a 
particular position. In resolving this issue, then, it is 
important to keep in mind that the touchstone of political 
patronage analysis is that the "hiring authority [must] 
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate 
requirement for the effective performance of the public 
office involved." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the "corporate 
power of the county [is] vested in a board of county 
commissioners." 16 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 3203. Accordingly, 
Boyle argues, and appellees do not dispute, that a majority 
of the Board of County Commissioners are the only officials 
vested with the authority to appoint or dismiss Boyle. When 
a majority of the Board--and thus, a majority of the "hiring 
authority"--testifies that political affiliation is not an 
appropriate requirement for the position of Deputy Director, 
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it is difficult to see how this fact can be considered "merely 
colorable or not significantly probative."4 
 
In support of the district court's decision, the appellees 
rely on Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993). 
In that case, plaintiff, a Republican, alleged that he was 
terminated from his position as Director of Veterans' 
Administrative Services for the State of New Jersey on the 
basis of his political affiliation after Governor Florio took 
office. The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff occupied 
a confidential, policymaking position from which he could 
be dismissed on the basis of political affiliation. Waskovich 
v. Morgano, 800 F. Supp. 1220 (D.N.J. 1992). On appeal, 
this court affirmed. 
 
The plaintiff argued on appeal that summary judgment 
was inappropriate because two government officials had 
testified that political affiliation was not a proper 
requirement for the position of Director of Veterans' 
Administrative Services. The Deputy Adjutant General had 
testified that "party affiliation is not a qualification for the 
job of [D]irector of veterans' Administrative Services." 
Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1301. In addition, the Deputy 
Commissioner testified that political affiliation did not play 
a part in whether the Director retains his job. Id. 
 
This court held that these deposition testimonies did not 
create a genuine issue of material fact based on the 
absence of such testimony favorable to the plaintiff by the 
Adjutant General himself, "the only official who is vested 
with the statutory authority to appoint or dismiss the 
Director." Id. at 1302. The question, this court reasoned, 
must focus on whether the Adjutant General, as the hiring 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Moreover, although the district court disposed of the significance of 
the testimonies in conclusory fashion, the language employed by the 
court reveals that it may have crossed the threshold into inappropriate 
weighing of the evidence. The district court found the testimonies to be 
insignificant "[i]n light of the undisputed evidence regarding plaintiff 
's 
authorized and actual duties as Deputy Director . . . ." The court did not 
merely note the existence of contradictory evidence, but rather, 
measured the weight of the deposition testimonies with what it regarded 
as overwhelming evidence on the other side. 
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authority, had a valid basis to prefer an individual of one 
political party over another.5Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Waskovich court also noted that the two government officials had 
also testified to the importance of the Director's sharing the same 
general philosophy as his superiors. 2 F.3d at 1301-02. One government 
official had testified that "[i]t is extremely important that . . . we are 
all 
in concurrence in regard to the philosophy that the Department has 
adopted, to [e]nsure that the policy has been carried out." The other 
official testified stressed the importance of the Director and his 
superiors 
sharing the same "philosophical judgment." 
 
Appellees in this case point to what they describe as similar favorable 
testimony by Cranmer: 
 
       Q: Third: "Coordinating the airport public information program." Is 
       there a rational connection between party affiliation and doing 
       that, those duties? 
 
       A: Well, again, there is not. Now certainly, there is a 
relationship 
       between -- Certainly want people working for you that share the 
       same goals and objectives and the manner in which you are 
       going to arrive at those objectives in those positions. Whether 
       they be Democrats or Republicans is irrelevant, but certainly, 
       the previous administration and majority of the people that 
       worked for the previous administration, there was a different 
       ideology, there was a different mind set. They had different 
       objectives, so to say if someone is a Democrat or Republican at 
       face value, that those two labels mean anything isn't the case, 
       but certainly, what they believe does. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Q: Is it a legitimate consideration for placement or retention the 
       fact that someone voted Democrat or Republican or voted for 
       you? 
 
       A: I am saying in some cases, it could be; in some cases, it 
       wouldn't be. It all depends on that individual. 
 
       Q: So it's an individual decision, is that what you are saying? 
 
       A: It's still based upon that person and what they believe and what 
       they stand for; and because of that, they vote one way or they 
       vote the other. Generally, there probably could be a line that 
       could be drawn down party-by-party affiliation, but that doesn't 
       always hold true. 
 
This testimony is notable for its utter vagueness and ambiguity. It seems 
that the only clear statement made by Cranmer is that there is no 
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Waskovich is readily distinguishable. In the case at bar, 
Cranmer and Dawida were not merely government officials 
who lacked hiring authority. Rather, they were two out of 
three Commissioners who had the actual authority to 
appoint or dismiss Boyle. Indeed, their testimonies relate 
directly to whether the "hiring authority" had a valid basis 
to prefer an individual of one political party over another. 
 
Case law in this circuit and elsewhere6  supports the 
conclusion that statements by a hiring authority to the 
effect that political affiliation is not a proper requirement 
for a particular governmental position are indeed 
significant. In Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977), for example, plaintiff had 
been appointed to a position as an Administrative Assistant 
II in a department of the Redevelopment Authority of 
Philadelphia. When a new Executive Director took office, 
plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that, 
inter alia, he was terminated for his political affiliation in 
violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 391-92. 
 
Evidence adduced through discovery was conflicting. On 
the one hand, deposition testimony revealed that plaintiff 
was merely a "soldier;" that he only oversaw bidding 
practices to uncover corruption and to ensure that policies 
implemented by others were carried out; that he had no 
power to decide which bids for relocation work would be 
accepted; and that he only worked for the actual 
policymaker in the department. Id. at 392. At one point, the 
Executive Director himself testified that the plaintiff's 
primary duty was to act as a spy for the former Director of 
the Authority. Id. On the other hand, evidence also showed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
rational connection between party affiliation and performing the duty of 
"Coordinating the airport public information program." At best, Cranmer 
testified that similar ideology, in general, is desirable, but he makes no 
reference to Boyle's duties in this context. Such vague statements cannot 
measure against the rather clear statements at issue in Waskovich. 
 
6. See, e.g., Burchett v. Cheek, 637 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (W.D. Va. 1985) 
(ordering reinstatement of assistant registrar of county based, inter 
alia, 
on trial testimony of general registrar that political affiliation was 
irrelevant to position), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 
486 U.S. 1006 (1988). 
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that the plaintiff helped rewrite the "relocation code"; that 
he was a "top line" employee; and that he oversaw work 
and reviewed bids. Id. In reversing the district court's grant 
of summary judgment, the court stated that 
 
       the determination of status as a policymaker vel non 
       presents a difficult factual question. Where there is 
       evidence to support the employee's claim that he does 
       not make policy, as there is here, he is entitled to a full 
       trial on the issue. Indeed, the state bears the burden of 
       persuasion on that question at trial. Certainly, then, it 
       was improper for the district court to weigh the 
       evidence and rule against [plaintiff] on this issue on a 
       Rule 56 motion. 
 
Id. at 394 n.5. 
 
This court went on to find that "two of the defendants 
admitted [plaintiff's] status as a non-policymaker, while as 
to the other two defendants, [plaintiff 's] status represented 
a genuine issue of material fact." Id. This court held that 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment to 
defendants on these facts, finding that the lower court had 
improperly engaged in weighing the evidence. Id. at 392-93. 
 
In Furlong v. Gudknecht, 808 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 
1986), the plaintiff, a Second Deputy to the Recorder of 
Deeds and a Democrat, brought an action in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania to preliminarily enjoin the newly 
elected Republican Recorder of Deeds from terminating her 
position. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for 
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 
based, in part, upon the following testimony of the 
defendant Recorder of Deeds: 
 
       [Q.] Mr. Gudknecht, is political party affiliation of the 
       first or second deputy important with respect to 
       the performance of their official duties? 
 
       [A.] No, it's not. 
 
Id. The defendant, in later testimony, attempted to change 
his answer, but the district court, while allowing it into 
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evidence, discredited the later testimony. Id. This court 
affirmed.7 
 
The notion that statements made by members of a hiring 
authority--to the effect that political affiliation is not a 
proper consideration in hiring or firing--constitute 
probative evidence is consonant with the rationale and 
policy underlying the Elrod/Branti exception. We do not 
dispute that political patronage has traditionally played an 
important role in the political process, and as has been 
vigorously argued by various judges and legal 
commentators, political patronage has proven to be a 
necessary and beneficial practice. As a practical matter, 
however, political patronage provides benefits which inure 
primarily to the elected officials invoking the privilege. 
Indeed, as Justice Brennan writing for the plurality in Elrod 
persuasively argued, the benefits derived from political 
patronage should not be overstated.8 As noted by the Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. It should be noted that Furlong dealt specifically with the issue of 
whether the possibility of an employee's statutory ascension to a 
superior's elected office in itself is sufficient to qualify the 
employee's 
position for an Elrod/Branti exception. Accordingly, this case is not 
directly on point with the facts of the case at bar. However, it is 
instructive to note how both the district court and this court addressed 
the admission by the Recorder of Deeds that political affiliation was not 
important with respect to the position of second deputy. In contrast to 
the district court in this case, both courts found that particular 
evidence 
extremely probative. 
 
8. In his opinion, Justice Brennan identified three separate governmental 
interests arguably served by political patronage dismissals: (1) the 
interest in effective and efficient government; (2) the need for loyal 
employees to implement the programs of a democratically elected 
administration; and (3) the preservation of strong and broad-based 
political parties. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364-68. 
 
With regard to the first identified interest, Justice Brennan noted that 
rather than promoting efficiency, "the wholesale replacement of large 
numbers of public employees every time political office changes hands 
belies this justification." Id. at 364. Moreover, it is not clear at all, 
Justice Brennan continued, that political patronage dismissal will result 
in replacement by a person "more qualified to do the job since 
appointment often occurs in exchange for the delivery of votes, or other 
party service, not job capability." Id. at 364-65. Justice Brennan 
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in O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, ___ U.S. 
___, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 2361 (1996), the "absolute right to 
enforce a patronage scheme . . . has not been shown to be 
a necessary part of a legitimate political system in all 
instances." Thus, while the general public certainly derives 
benefits from political patronage--insofar as strong political 
parties are an important aspect of the American democratic 
process--these benefits are, at best, indirect.9 As Justice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
concluded by commenting that "[m]ore fundamentally, . . . the argument 
does not succeed because it is doubtful that the mere difference of 
political persuasion motivates poor performance; nor do we think it 
legitimately may be used as a basis for imputing such behavior." Id. at 
365. 
 
In response to the loyalty argument, Justice Brennan acknowledged 
that it possessed some force, but was ultimately unavailing. The 
government's interest in loyalty can be adequately protected by 
"[l]imiting 
patronage dismissals to policymaking positions . . .." Id. at 367. 
 
With regard to the third justification for political patronage, Justice 
Brennan first acknowledged that the preservation of the democratic 
process was an interest the protection of which may in certain 
circumstances justify limitations on First Amendment rights. Id. at 368. 
 
       But however important preservation of the two-party system or any 
       system involving a fixed number of parties may or may not be, . . . 
       we are not persuaded that the elimination of patronage practice or, 
       as is specifically involved here, the interdiction of patronage 
       dismissals, will bring about the demise of party politics. 
Political 
       parties existed in the absence of active patronage practice prior 
to 
       the administration of Andrew Jackson, and they have survived 
       substantial reduction in their patronage power through the 
       establishment of merit systems. 
 
Id. at 369 (citations omitted). 
 
9. As intimated previously, this court recognizes that this somewhat 
narrow view of political patronage as fundamental to the democratic 
process, as espoused by Justice Brennan, is not universally accepted. In 
his dissent in Branti, Justice Powell admonished that "[p]atronage 
appointments help build stable political parties by offering rewards to 
persons who assume the tasks necessary to the continued functioning of 
political organizations." 445 U.S. at 528. Justice Powell emphasized the 
historic role of political patronage in democratizing the political 
process, 
stimulating political activity over a wider pool of the American 
population 
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Brennan cogently noted, "[p]artisan politics bears the 
imprimatur only of tradition, not the Constitution." Elrod, 
427 U.S. at 369 n.22. 
 
Moreover, whatever benefits the "tradition" of political 
patronage may provide surely is counterbalanced by the 
resulting limitation on First Amendment freedoms. In Elrod, 
Justice Brennan noted that "[p]atronage . . . to the extent 
it compels or restrains belief and association is inimical to 
the process which undergirds our system of government 
and is `at war with the deeper traditions of democracy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and contributing to the maintenance of strong and accountable political 
parties. Elrod, 427 U.S. 377-79 (Powell, J., dissenting); Branti, 445 U.S. 
522 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). These themes are shared with equal 
conviction by Justice Scalia who, in a dissenting opinion in Rutan, 
concluded that "[s]uch a venerable and accepted tradition [as political 
patronage] is not to be laid on the examining table and scrutinized for 
its 
conformity to some abstract principle of First Amendment adjudication 
devised by this Court. To the contrary, such traditions are themselves 
the stuff out of which the Court's principles is to be formed." 497 U.S. 
95-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
Similarly, former Chief Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert has been extremely 
critical of the Elrod/Branti decisions, noting that his only reason for 
following them was his strong loyalty to stare decisis. Loughney v. 
Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring) 
(characterizing his disagreement with Elrod and Branti as "vehement 
disagreement"). In Judge Aldisert's view, Elrod and Branti 
 
       reflect the apogee of a process that seeks to "constitutionalize" 
the 
       entire fabric of American society. This process transmutes the 
       United States Constitution from a broad statement of moral values 
       into a detailed code of conduct, ignoring Chief Justice Marshall's 
       admonition that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we 
       are expounding." 
 
Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). 
Judge Aldisert is not the only member of this court to hold a critical 
view 
of the limitations imposed on the practice of political patronage by the 
Elrod/Branti line of decisions. See,e.g., Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 
105-10 (3d Cir. 1996) (Becker, J., concurring). 
 
We believe, however, that such views--which essentially raise the 
"tradition" of political patronage above the fundamental rights provided 
in the First Amendment--remain in the minority. 
 
                                25 
 
 
 
embodied in the First Amendment.' " 427 U.S. at 357 
(quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis , 473 F.2d 
561, 576 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973)). 
"Thus, if patronage contributes at all to the elective 
process, that contribution is diminished by the practice's 
impairment of the same." Id. at 369. And whatever "the 
gain to representative government provided by the practice 
of patronage, if any, would be insufficient to justify its 
sacrifice of First Amendment rights."10 Id. 
 
That whatever benefits derived from political patronage 
are "diminished by the practice's impairment of " 
fundamental First Amendment principles is manifested in 
the very structure of political patronage analysis mandated 
under Elrod, Branti and their progeny. For instance, the 
burden, characterized as a substantial one, is placed 
squarely upon defendants to prove that political affiliation 
is an appropriate requirement for a particular position. 
Moreover, courts must apply the intermediate "exacting" 
level of scrutiny in such cases. 
 
Accordingly, political patronage is a practice which 
primarily benefits those political entities that invoke the 
privilege. When those political entities themselves testify 
that political affiliation is or should not be an important 
consideration, as in this case, such evidence, at the very 
least, creates a genuine issue of material fact precluding 
summary judgment. Put another way, if the hiring 
authority is obligated to demonstrate that political 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for a particular 
position, then we cannot see how its own statements 
relating directly on the issue can be considered anything 
less than probative. The appellees' argument, to the effect 
that the testimonies of the two Commissioners should be 
ignored and the court should rely solely on the inherent 
functions of the position in question, exalts form over 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. That the Supreme Court's expansive view of First Amendment rights 
in the context of political patronage cases remains intact is exemplified 
by its decision last year in O'Hare Truck Service, in which the Court 
extended the protections of Elrod and Branti to independent contractors. 
O'Hare Truck Service thus overruled this court's prior decision in Horn v. 
Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
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substance in the context of this case, rendering the 
analysis called for under Elrod, Branti and their progeny 
overly formalistic. The significant encroachment upon First 
Amendment rights by the practice of political patronage 
does not justify such an approach. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order 
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment is 
reversed, and this matter will be remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
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